Introduction 1 2
In recent years there has been a growing interest in design and deployment of 3 intelligent transportation systems and especially advanced traveler information services. 4
These systems use information and communication technology to inform, monitor, control 5 and even charge travelers (Bonsall, 2008) . It is commonly assumed that providing 6 travelers with more reliable information will improve the individual traveler"s route-choice 7 decisions and consequently the networks performance and safety (European Commission, 8 2008) . However, improving our understanding of travelers" response to information is still a 9 key issue to obtain the full benefits from such applications. This response is dependent on 10 travelers" decision making behavior under conditions associated with risk and uncertainty. 11
Expected Utility Theory (Bernoulli, 1738; Luce and Raiffa, 1957 ; Von Neumann and 12 Morgenstern, 1944) , has been the dominant paradigm in analyzing travel behavior under 13 risk and uncertainty and particularly in route-choice (Arentze and Timmermans, 2005; De 14 Palma and Picard, 2005) . It suggests that maximization of a linear combination of end 15 states and probabilities of these states normatively represents choice behavior. Random 16 utility models have been widely developed using various specifications to predict route 17 choice decisions providing valuable behavioral insights (see Prashker and Bekhor, 2004 18 for a detailed review). Chorus et al., (2009) , demonstrate the use of a Bayesian EUT 19 framework to assess the effects of travel information on route-choice. 20
Behavioral decision research has empirically revealed systematic violations of some 21 of the assumptions of Expected Utility Theory (EUT). Some researchers have even raised 22 concern over its validity in forecasting travel behavior (Gärling and Young, 2001 ). The 23 most common behavioral theory to substitute EUT is Prospect Theory (Kahneman and 24 Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) . Prospect Theory (PT) asserts that decision 25 makers frame possible outcomes as gains or losses based on a subjective point of 26 reference and not according to final-states as the classic interpretation of EUT suggests. 27
Whereas in EUT, decision makers are usually assumed as risk-averse, in PT, people will 28 usually reveal risk-averse behavior in the case of gains and risk-seeking behavior in the 29 case of losses. In addition, PT postulates that people are more sensitive to a loss 30 compared to an equivalent gain, implying loss aversion. Furthermore, unlike EUT 31 probabilities are not treated linearly; rather an S-shaped weighting function is applied, 32 whereby small probabilities are overweighed and large probabilities underweighted. PT 33 has also been tested in route-choice contexts and found to have added explanatory value 34 one-shot decisions where the outcomes of the choice are not explicitly revealed ex-post. In 23 reality travelers" behavior is influenced not only by descriptional information regarding 24 possible alternative routes, but also by experiential information gained through a process 25 of Reinforced Learning (RL) based on feedbacks. Studies based on RL (Busemeyer and 26 Townsend, 1993; Erev and Barron, 2005) assert that experience leads to adaptive learning 27 but, at the same time, this is also a function of sampling available information on the basis 28 of past experience from memory. Moreover as also demonstrated for route-choice by 29 Avineri and Prashker, (2003) and Ben-Elia et al. (2008) , the choice behavior in RL is quite 30 sensitive to the degree of uncertainty in the environment. 31
EUT has been adapted to repeated travel choice situations using the notion of utility 32 updating over time (Horowitz, 1984) . Here, route-choice is based on a process of adaptive 33 learning whereby all sources of information either descriptive and / or experiential areapplied to update the level of knowledge over the road network (e.g. : Cascetta and 1 Cantarella, 1991; Mahmassani and Liu, 1999; Srinivasan and Mahmassani, 2003; Watling 2 and van Vuren, 1993) . PT has also been tested in dynamic contexts. However, unlike 3 EUT, the basic assumptions of PT do not necessarily hold when moving from one-shot to 4 sequences of choices. For example, Barron and Erev (2003) found risk attitude reversals 5 when feedback is introduced in repeated choice experiments. Contrary to one shot 6 decisions, they showed that in repeated choice situations with feedbacks, participants tend 7 to avoid risks when faced with losses and accept more risks when faced with prospective 8 gains. In route-choice, Ben-Elia and Shiftan, (2010) showed that risk seeking behavior is 9 apparent mainly in the short run when knowledge over the network"s performance is 10 relatively limited; whereas in the long run, when learning is sufficiently reinforced, the trend 11 is towards risk aversion. Moreover, they did not find, in the context of a choice model 12 behavior completely consistent with PT. Although differences relative to a reference point 13 (mean travel time in this case) seem to have some significance in explaining route-choice 14 behavior, neither was a real difference between gains and losses identified (i.e. no 15 evidence for loss aversion), nor was the PT-based specification better in terms of model fit 16 compared to an EUT specification. However, given that only one reference point definition 17 was tested, it is difficult to generalize from their findings on the appropriateness of PT in 18 dynamic decisions. A recent behavioral study by Erev et al. (2008) asserts that in repeated 19 choice situations with immediate feedback, behavioral tendencies previously related to 20 loss aversion in decisions from experience, are better described as consequences of 21 diminishing sensitivity to absolute payoffs. These studies put a question mark on the 22 appropriateness of PT to explain choice behavior in repetitive situations. 23
In relation to RT, like in the case of EUT and PT, behavioral research regarding 24 regret aversion -the theory"s principle behavioral factor -also demonstrates the 25 importance of expected feedback on the perception of regret. According to the original 26 version of RT (Loomes and Sugden, (1982) , before choosing, the decision-maker 27 compares "what is" under a particular state with "what might have been" for an alternative 28 under the same state -which results in anticipated regret or rejoice (the opposite of 29 regret). However, as argued by Zeelenberg, (1999) , in order to evaluate an alternative by 30 comparing "what is" with "what might have been", the decision maker must learn, ex-post 31
choice, "what might have been" implies. In other words, both the chosen and foregone 32 alternatives must be resolved for anticipated regret or rejoice to influence behavior. The 33 original version of RT does not explicitly account for the resolution of the outcomes of 34 foregone alternatives in stimulating anticipated regret. A different view is expressed by 1 (2004) suggesting that the resolution of foregone alternatives is less cardinal 2 than the ability of the decision maker to learn exactly which state-of-the world has 3 occurred. This is especially relevant in situations where only the outcome of a chosen 4 alternative is revealed ex-post (i.e. experiential feedback) but not those of foregone 5 alternatives, and the decision maker is not fully informed which state-of-the world has 6 actually occurred. In comparing the importance of expected regrets that will be 7 experienced ex-post with those that will not, Larrick, (1993) suggests that it seems 8 reasonable to assume that feedback about what definitely would have occurred could well 9 have a greater potential for regret than abstract knowledge of what was statistically likely 10 to occur as assumed in original RT. This assertion forms the rationale of a revised theory 11 of RT called Feedback-conditional RT (Humphrey, 2004) . This theory postulates that the 12 effect of feedback (following a choice) on the anticipated emotion of rejoice or regret 13 depends on whether the state-of-the world is revealed (i.e. is the foregone alternative 14 resolved). More specifically, it predicts for any outcomes x and y, where the utility of x is 15 larger than the utility of y, rejoice for x is greater when having x fully reveals the state-of-16 the world than when it is not, whereas regret for y is smaller when having y does not fully 17 reveal the state of the world. 18
Humphrey
Returning to the transportation realm, in most situations, it is highly likely that the 19 traveler receives feedback on their chosen route but not necessarily on the non-chosen 20 routes. Feedback on a chosen route is almost immediate -e.g. the travel time 21 experienced to have reached the destination, whereas discovering what were the travel 22 times on non-chosen routes requires active search for information and is not immediately 23 available. Since RT has shown a considerable potential for explaining travel behavior, 24 there is added value in investigating its salience in as real to life environment as possible 25 such as the case of experiential feedback on the chosen route. 26
In order to test the impact of RT on route choice we reinvestigate the route-choice 27 behavior data collected in the experiment conducted by Ben-Elia et al., (2008) . We apply a 28
RT-based modeling framework as suggested by Chorus, (2010) and incorporate the effect 29 of experiential feedbacks in the specification of regret based on the rationale of Feedback-30 Consistent RT (Humphrey, 2004) . The rest of the paper is organized in the following way: 31 Section 2 presents the experimental method; Section 3 describes the modeling 32 frameworks and the tested specifications; Section 4 presents the results and a discussion; 33 and in Section 5 we present some conclusions and future research directions. 34
2.
Experiment and data 1
Design

3
A route-choice experiment was designed on the basis of a simple binary network 4 and one origin-destination pair (work and home). Route A is on average faster than route 5 B. The faster route has a mean of 25 minutes and the slower one -30 minutes. Three 6 traffic scenarios were designed by manipulating the routes" travel time ranges (i.e. 7 deviation around the mean value). These ranges are 5 or 15 minutes for each route. 8 Table 1 presents the three travel time scenarios applied in the experiment. The experiment 9
consists of 100 choice trials in each scenario. Each trial simulates a daily trip. The order of 10 the scenarios follows a counterbalanced (blocked randomization) design. The treatment 11 condition (here: informed) in the experiment consisted of the provision of ex-ante travel 12 information in the form of a travel time range corresponding to a particular traffic scenario 13 simulating a simple variable message sign (VMS) presented to travelers before a route 14 diversion. This information is not provided in the control condition (here: non-informed arriving in random order to the lab were divided randomly into two groups between the 21 treatment condition (N=24) and the control group (N=25). Each participant was also 22 allocated randomly to one of the six (that is 3! blocks) possible orders. Table 2 presents 23 the descriptive statistics of the participant sample. 24
Each participant was seated in front of a computer terminal and provided with 25 written on-screen instructions about the task ahead. The instructions were also read out 26 loud by the assistant. The task was to choose (by selecting a radio button) among two 27 routes to return home after a day"s work. They were explained that this task is to be 28 repeated several times for different commuting days and in several different scenarios. 29
Participants were not informed in advance how many "days" or how many scenarios they 30 are expected to complete. However, they were told when one scenario would end and a 31 new scenario is about to begin. In the treatment condition only, participants were also told 32 that they will receive travel information before each daily choice. No other explanation was 33
given as to the nature of the experimental task. Each participant had a budget of 100 ILStotal and what was the total monetary cost of their travel time.. Overall the average 23 duration of a typical session lasted no more than 15 minutes per participant. For further 24 details on the experiment design see Ben-Elia et al., (2008) . 25 26 *** Table 2 -about here *** 27 28
Reducing possible threats to validity
29
A common concern in longitudinal designs is the problem of participant fatigue 30 confounding treatment effects or alternatives" attributes thus threatening the validity of the 31 obtained estimates and results. Fatigue occurs when participants tire over time causing 32 performance to deteriorate in later conditions or assessments. Some marketing and 33 psychology studies find that the precision of respondents" choices declines moderately 1 with repeated choice tasks because they become fatigued (Elrod et al., 1992) . Conversely, 2 learning effects manifest themselves in participants becoming better the more often they 3 do the experimental task. 4
Proper experiment design, is the first step in reducing the magnitude of fatigue 5 problems e.g. by counterbalancing treatment orders so that order effects can be assessed. 6
If order effects are not distinguished the problem of carryover effects can be regarded as 7 less detrimental on the internal validity of the results (Shadish et al., 2002) . The second 8 step is careful analysis of the obtained results. The approach typically used to distinguish 9 between the two effects is based on the assertion that learning implies a smaller noise to 10 signal ratio from observed choices whereas fatigue results in a larger noise to signal ratio. 11
A typical measure is to examine the change over time in the variability of the response 12 (e..g changes in the standard deviation). Third, in choice modeling terms, learning is 13 usually observed by a decrease (increase) in the magnitude of the variance (scale) 14 parameter as the respondent progresses through the sequence of questions or (at least) 15 until fatigue sets in. Fatigue, in contrast, is evident when by an increasing value for the 16 variance of the error term in later choices, or equivalently, by decreasing its scale 17 (Bateman et al, 2008) . Several studies have been carried out to investigate the magnitude 18 of fatigue and or learning in choice models. However to most parts, the evidence remains 19 inconclusive. Bradley and Daly (1994) find fatigue effects in SP choice experiments 20 involving a small number of repetitions. In contrast, Brazell et al. (1995) suggest fatigue 21 effects may be minimal whereas learning may sometimes occur as respondents are 22 exposed to more replications. Furthermore, Brazell and Louviere (1997) reveal equivalent 23 survey response rates and parameter estimates for respondents answering 12, 24, 48 and 24 96 choice questions in a particular choice task. Swait and Adamowicz (1996) , show that 25 task complexity is inversely related to fatigue. Savage and Waldman (2008) distinguish between them. Notwithstanding, the discussion in the choice modeling 34 literature relates to studies involving description-based decisions without feedbacks on 1 choice outcomes and usually involving multiple attributes, whereas the effects of fatigue in 2 experiential-based decisions, as is in our study, remains an open question. 3
As fatigue or boredom are always a plausible alternative explanation that could 4 confound the treatment effects, we have conducted a separate analysis of fatigue threats 5 based on the state-of-the-art, which is presented following the results in Section 4.2. 6
3.
Behavior modeling 7
Approach 8
The data collected by Ben-Elia et al. (2008) consists of a series of choices under 9 different conditions of risk. This data were not designed with the objective of a priori testing 10 RT or any other behavioral theory. Therefore, if regret appears as a significant effect, it 11 provides a strong indication to the relevance of regret in similar route-choice decisions. 12
Since the data contains a panel of choices for each participant we use a modified 13 version of the mixed logit discrete choice model. Mixed Logit (MXL and also referred to as 14 Logit Kernel or Mixed Multinomial Logit Model) is an advanced and highly flexible discrete 15 choice model. MXL accommodates random taste variation, substitution patterns, and 16 correlation in unobserved factors unrestricted over time (McFadden and Train, 2000) and 17 can be derived under a variety of different specifications (Ben-Akiva and Bolduc, 1996; 18 Bhat, 1998) It is also easily generalized to allow for repeated choices i.e. panel data, as 19 well as lagged variables (Bhat, 1999; Revelt and Train, 1998; Train, 1999) . 20
For our purposes two types of models are specified: the first for expected utility 21 (EU) and the second for expected modified utility (EMU) which includes the regret effect 22 based on the formulation of Chorus (2010) . We use the term "modified utility" (MU) to 23 distinguish the utility function according to RT from the term "utility" (U) according to EUT. 24
Formally the utility (U) of alternative i for person n in response t is (eq. 3): 25
where: β is a vector of fixed and random coefficients for alternatives" attributes -X;  is a 27 vector of independently, identically distributed (iid) extreme-value type one error term. β 28 has some distribution f (β 0 mean and a covariance matrix  β ). This term also capture the 29 panel effects -varying between participants but remaining constant within the observation 30 panel set of each participant. Often a normal distribution is assumed i.e.
. 1 Accordingly, the expected utility (EU) of alternative i for person n in response t is (eq. 4): 2 (4) 3 where: p j [0,1] is the probability that state-of-the-world j will occur at response t out of the 4 set of J possible states of the world -S. 5
Conversely, MU depends on both the considered and foregone alternatives. Following 6
Chorus (2010), the modified utility (MU) of alternative i for person n in response t is (eq.5): 7
where: β, X and are similar to eq. 3 and the term in curly brackets represents the effect 9 of regret towards alternative k when considering i. That is, in considering i, person n 10 accounts also for the utility difference attributed to X for the foregone alternative k. 11 is a regret aversion parameter. Higher values imply that person n will become 12 more and more sensitive to regret compared to an equivalent rejoice. In other words a 13 higher value suggests that if for attribute X, k is outperforming i (i.e. a regret emotion) this 14 will decrease the attractiveness of i more than in the reverse case where i outperforms k 15
a rejoice emotion). 16
Similarly, the expected modified utility (EMU) of alternative i for person m in response t is 17 (eq. 6): 18
Assumptions and considerations
21
The purpose of the model estimation here is to test whether regret influences route-22 choice behavior as it appears in the data by comparing various model specifications. To 23 accomplish this several simplifications were allowed and further assumptions were made: 24 First, given both the small (49 participants) and homogenous nature of the sample 25 used in the experiment (undergraduates) it is not possible to include individual-specific 26 factors (see also discussion in Ben-Elia et al., 2010) . 27
Second, to allow a smooth comparison between alternative specifications (with and 28 without Regret) we decided to include travel time as the only attribute explaining the route 29 choice. The data provides us with two sources of travel time: ex-ante travel time 30 information (description) and "actual" travel time (feedback). The latter is specified as alagged variable. To keep the specifications simple a generic coefficient is used for all 1 sources of travel time. That is, in relation to eq.3 and eq.5, β corresponds to the travel time 2 coefficient and is specified as the same coefficient for both routes and for all sources. 3
Initially we also tested different coefficients for the two sources of travel time; however they 4
were not found to be significantly different from each other suggesting that the generic 5 form is sufficient. For examples of more comprehensive models using the same data see 6
Ben-Elia and Shiftan, (2010) . 7
Third, in the treatment condition, the information received by the participants, in 8 each trial of the experiment, simulates a simple Variable Message Sign (VMS) presenting 9 a description of the expected travel time in a range from a minimum to a maximum value. 10
This range creates the possible states of the world that a participant would anticipate in 11 his/her decision making process. Although the inherent assumption in both EUT and RT is 12 that the decision maker can mentally produce the matrix of state-contingent outcomes 13 even if it is not explicitly provided in the description of the decision problem, it is unlikely 14 that a human mind would be able to mentally account for a large number of states-of-the-15 world. Likewise, given a range of possible outcomes, it is also unlikely that only the mean 16 value (the mid range) would be considered as the only state-of-the world accounted for. 17
Hence, it is assumed that participants would regard as a minimum two points on the range 18 as being identified with the possible states of the world -one below (i.e. the first quarter) 19 and the other above (i.e. the 3 rd quarter) the mean value (see Figure 1) . Naturally, any 20 assumption regarding these or other sets of points suggested by the modeler is valid. 21
However, it is reasonable to assume that participants would view extreme outcomes as 22 less likely than the middle one. It should also be noted that the participants were not aware 23 that the travel time distribution was in fact uniform meaning that all outcomes had the 24 same probability to occur. Moreover, using extreme values such as the best and worst 25 travel time on the range might well lead to inflating the estimates of regret we are looking 26 for which seems counterproductive. Therefore, if theses mid points reveal significant 27 Fourth, as presented in the Introduction, the behavioral literature suggests the 3 plausibility that emotions of regret or rejoice, can be also triggered by the expected 4 feedback received after a choice is made. It is then likely that in anticipating regret, 5 participants would factor in some way both the experiential feedbacks and the information 6 describing the expected outcomes. In this respect Bar-Hillel and Neter (1996) have shown 7 that in some cases regret effects generated by counterfactual thinking can be as strong as 8 those generated by actual feedback. In each choice trial the participant receives the actual 9 experienced travel time on the chosen route as an ex post feedback, but not 10 simultaneously that of the foregone route. Consequently, he/she cannot know for certain 11 which state-of-the-world occurred at a specific trial on the route not chosen. Therefore, it is 12 assumed that participants can compare the outcome of the considered route in the last 13 trial with the memory of what had been experienced the last time that the alternative route 14 was actually chosen. Accordingly, one can assume that regret emotions can be triggered 15 not only by the differences attributed to descriptive information (as in the original version of 16 RT) but also by the comparison between what was experienced the last time the 17 considered route was chosen (i.e. experiential feedback) and the memory of what had 18 occurred when the alternative route had been chosen. This can be regarded asa kind of 19 variant on feedback conditional RT). Weights can also be specified for descriptional and 20 experiential information to account for the difference in the cognitive importance given to 21 expected and experienced regret (or rejoice) in the choice behavior. 22
The fifth consideration relates to the treatment of risk perception (i.e. risk aversion 23 or risk seeking tendencies) and how risk is related to regret. In his formulation, Chorus 24 (2010) accounts for constant risk aversion by assuming a non-linear convex EU function. 25
We initially tested the effect of constant risk aversion on EU, but found it not significant. 26
Consequently all our models applied a linear specification of utility. The literature suggests 27 that risk aversion and regret aversion are often confounded in many experimental settings 28 (Zeelenberg, 1999) . This can make the differentiation between the two effects quite 29 difficult. Moreover, Zeelenberg et al. (1996) report an experiment where regret aversion 30 can induce both risk-averse and risk-seeking choices depending on the type of feedback -31 experiential or foregone. The latter induces more risk seeking behaviors than the former. 32 Therefore, we decided to test indirectly for a relation between risk and regret by specifying 33 different coefficients of regret aversion for each of the three travel time scenarios. Bydesign, each scenario frames the two routes either as risky or as reliable depending on the 1 level of variability represented in the travel time range (See Table 1) . 2 Last, in all the discussions of Regret Theory the inherent assumption is that the 3 decision maker is presented with a description of the possible alternatives she can choose 4 from. As noted above, feedback received following a choice can also be considered, but 5 so far only in addition to the initial description. However, there is no apparent reason why 6 regret cannot be triggered by an outcome of a choice which is not based on a complete 7 description of the alternatives but rather on a gradual process of sampling and reinforced 8 learning based on experiential feedback information. One can assume that ex-post regret 9 could well occur regardless of the type of information provided, especially when the choice 10 environment allows participants to test more than once each of the two alternative routes. 11
Hence, there is added value to verify whether there is a real difference in the strength of 12 regret emotions triggered by exposure to descriptional versus experiential feedback 13 information. Given that the experimental design consists of two groups i.e. conditions with 14 and without descriptional information, it is possible to jointly estimate the strength of regret 15 emotions under both conditions simultaneously. 16
Specifications
17
Based on the above discussion, six models are specified. Model A through D are 18 based on the descriptional information (i.e. travel time ranges) and, therefore, are only 19 applicable for the group of participants in the informed condition (N=24). Models E and F 20 are based on the full dataset and include a joint estimation of regret under both the 21 informed and non-informed conditions (N=49). 22
Model A: Description-based expected utility 23
Model A corresponds to a simple EU model where only the considered route 24 influences its perceived attractiveness and utility is based on the provided descriptional 25 information. This model is estimated as a control for comparing to more sophisticated 26 specifications based on regret. The two points corresponding to two states of the world 27 assumed for a given route i as described above (and see Figure 1 upper quartiles of the travel time range. Since EUT, assumes the decision makers treat 32 probabilities linearly (unlike e.g. PT which uses subjective weights) and since the 33 distribution of travel times in the experiment is uniform, the probabilities of the states of the 1 world are assumed to be equally distributed. Therefore, there is a probability of 0.5 to be in 2 the high or low state-of-the world for each route. Consequently the appropriate 3 specification (for simplification we removed the person and trial notations) for Route-A 4 (Route B is similar only with subscript B) is (eq. 7): 5 (7) 6 where: β, and are as defined in eq.3.
7
Model B: Description-based regret 8
Model B corresponds to RT under the assumptions of the original theory (Loomes 9 and Sugden, 1982) . In this case, the modified utility function -MU -is influenced by both 10 the attributes of the considered route and the alternative one. The choice between the two 11 routes is influenced only by the description of the alternatives i.e. the information 12 presented by the VMS prior to the actual choice. Each route is assumed to have two 13 possible outcomes (MH i , ML i ) and four states of the world are generated (according to the 14 2x2 combination of high and low values). Each state of the world has an equal probability 15 of 0.25 to occur. This combination is also illustrated in Figure 1 . Consequently, the 16 appropriate specification for Route-A is (eq. 8): 17 As presented in the previous section, it is quite possible that participants can be 24 influenced by both descriptional information as presented by the VMS and by the ex-post 25 feedback information provided following each route choice. Accordingly, for each state-of-26 the-world as defined in Model B, we can specify the regret function as composed of the 27 differences in the descriptional information (the four points on the travel time ranges) and 28 the difference in the feedback information. The latter is based on the assumption that 29 participants can recall the recent outcomes the last time each of the two routes was 30 chosen. Weights are assigned to both types of information to capture difference in 1 cognitive importance. The appropriate specification for Route-A is (eq. 9): 2
where: 0<w<1 is the weight attributed to the descriptive information (MH i , ML i ) and 1-w is 5 the weight for feedbacks; F i is the feedback received for Route i the last time i is chosen; 6 β,  and are as defined in eq.8.
8
Note that w=1 would mean that only descriptional information influences regret and 9 in this case the formulation would be the same as Model B. Conversely, w=0 would mean 10 that only feedbacks influence regret or rejoice emotions but descriptional information 11 provided ex-ante does not. In this case, the descriptive information enters the utility but 12 does not appear in the regret function and the formulation collapses to two states of the 13 world. The appropriate specification, for Route-A, in Model C, is now (eq. 10): 14 
21
where: β, and are as defined in eq.9, and  s (s=1,2,3) is the coefficient of regret
aversion in scenario s (s=1,2,3). 23
Here, significantly different values estimated for  s would imply that regret aversion 24 is not risk neutral. 25
Model E: Regret aversion with and without descriptional information 26
Model E uses the full dataset to estimate the effect of regret for each of the 27 experiment"s groups -treatment and control -i.e. with and without (descriptional) 28 information. Here, the motivation is not to identify if the source triggering regret is 29 description or experience based as in the previous models. Rather, it is to verify if by 1 exposing travelers to descriptional information as simulated in the VMS and in addition to 2 information gained from experience, would result in different degrees of regret aversion. 3 Accordingly the model utilizes a scale parameter to estimate the group effect on the rest of 4 the parameter estimates. This scale multiplies all the estimates relating to the non-5 informed group. It is similar to the approach used in a joint estimation of a discrete choice 6 model based on revealed and stated preference data sources (Ben Akiva and Morikawa, 7 1990; Bhat and Castellar, 2002) . Moreover, whereas the modified utility of informed 8 participants remains similar to Model C (as in eq. 9), the modified utility of the non-9 informed participants is specified as composed only of the experiential feedback 10 information and since here there is no possible way to identify the state-of-the-world 11 occuring the only effect is that of the recent outcomes the last time one of the two routes 12 was chosen. The appropriate specification, for Route-A, in Model E, is now (eq. 12) 13 (12) 14 where: F i , β,  and are as defined in eq.9. Superscript NI indicates this 15 corresponds to the non-informed group. 16
Model F: Joint estimation of regret with risk effects 17
Model F, expands Model E to account for the effects of risk as in Model D. The only 18 change is the modified utility for the non-informed condition which is now specified for 19 Route A as (eq 13): 20
where: F i , β,  and are as defined in eq.11. NI indicates this corresponds to the non-informed group. 23
Model estimation
24
In all the models EU and EMU are estimated using a log-likelihood (LL) maximization 25 procedure. The EMU model"s LL function (for EU replace EMU with EU) for the probability 26 (P) to choose route i is (eq. 14): 27  is the regret aversion coefficient to be estimated; 1 λ is the non-informed group"s scale and λ nt = [(1−δ nt,I )×λ]+δ nt,I , δ nt =1 if person n and trial t 2 belong to an observation from group I (i.e. informed) and 0 otherwise; 3 N=49 is the number of participants (=24 in Models A-D), T=300 is the number of route-4 choice trials, K=2 is the number of alternative routes. 5
As the unconditional probability is obtained by integration over the random 6 coefficients and this integrand has no closed form, simulated log likelihood (SLL) is applied 7 using random draws (Bhat, 1999; Train, 2003) where: R is the number of draws (r).
11
We used BIOGEME version 2.1 (Bierlaire, 2003; Bierlaire, 2010) for model 12 estimation. Simulated log likelihoods of all models were estimated with 1,000 Halton draws 13 (Halton, 1960) which significantly reduce the number of draws required compared to 14 pseudo-random draws (Bhat, 2003; Train, 2000) . The models were estimated with 100, 15 500 draws and 1,000 draws. The differences between the last two sets were negligible. 16
The results presented here are for the set of 1,000 draws. We also applied appropriate 17 guidelines to assure proper identification (Walker et al., 2004) . The CFSQP optimization 18 algorithm was used (Lawrence et al., 1997) . Since the weight parameter in Model C can 19 be confounded with the attribute coefficient (β), they cannot be estimated simultaneously. 20 Therefore, the weights were specified as constants with a linear constraint equal to 1. 21
Different sets of weights were tested in increments of 0.1 through a trial and error process. 
4.
Results and discussion 23
Estimation results
24
The estimation results are presented in Table 3 and Table 4 . Goodness of fit (final 25 log-likelihood) is measured with the log likelihood ratio test. When computed for the 26 informed group only (see Table 3 p<0.001). When comparing the joint estimated models for both groups (see Table 4 ) -1 Model E and F, the goodness of fit of Model F accounting for the risk effects is better 2 ( 2 E,F = 258.87, p<0.001). Naturally the goodness of fit of the joint models cannot be 3 compared with the single group models. 4
All the coefficients in all the six models are significant. The coefficient  β is 5 significant (p<0.001) implying the specification of the panel is appropriate for the data 6 structure. The coefficient for the mean travel time (β) is negative as expected and 7 significant in all the models (p<0.001). The coefficients for general regret () are all 8 significant (p<0.001). However, in Model B the sign of the coefficient is negative and 9 incorrect according to the assertions of RT. A negative sign for  implies that a considered alternative is preferred when it is outperformed by a foregone alternative, which seems 11
unreasonable. 12
In contrast, the estimate obtained for the regret aversion coefficient in Model C has 13 the correct sign and seems reasonable and comparable with the values used by Chorus 14 (2010). However, in terms of weighting of the descriptive and the feedback information, the 15 best result was obtained with w=0. This implies that the descriptive information does not 16 seem to influence regret; but rather the feedbacks are apparently responsible for 17 generating the emotion of regret aversion. 18
This result suggests that regret aversion is important and has a behavioral effect in 19 the experimental data. Moreover, it is evident that here regret aversion is more associated 20 with the ex-post feedback information compared to the ex-ante descriptive information. 21
When accounting only for the descriptive information (Model B) the wrong sign of the 22 regret parameter indicates that RT, in its original formulation, is not quite the appropriate 23 theory to account for the observed behavior in this case. The high t-stat of the coefficient 24 suggests it is capturing some variability in the data, but with the wrong specification. 25
However, when regret aversion is specified to the feedbacks obtained by the 26 participants from the actual travel time payoffs, (as in Model C) the results suggest that it is 27 really the feedback information that better explains the choice behavior. This leads us to 28 assert that emotions of regret are likely generated by the experiential feedback information 29 rather then the descriptional information. A possible explanation for this result is that the 30 feedbacks are more closely related in the traveler"s mind with the objective of minimizing 31 travel costs and less so to the description of the alternatives themselves. To our best 32 knowledge, this result has not been demonstrated before in an empirical travel behavior 33 study. As noted by Ben-Elia and Shiftan, (2010) the effect of information was mostly 1 relevant for the short run, when participants lacked experience and had little knowledge 2 about the payoff distribution of each route, whereas over time the effect of feedbacks and 3 experience became more dominant. The results regarding the effect of regret seem to 4 concur with these findings as well. 5
The results obtained for Model D suggest that regret aversion is evident but 6 changes between the different scenarios. Recall, that each participant concludes all three 7 scenarios (in different orders). The estimates obtained for  indicate that regret aversion is 8 stronger when the risk associated with the choice environment is low, as demonstrated in 9 scenario 3 where both routes have low variability. Conversely, in scenarios 1 and 2, where 10 one of the two routes is associated with more risk, regret seems to be weaker. This 11 suggests that increasing the variability in the choice environment (what behavioral 12 psychologists have referred to as the effect of payoff variability), decreases regret 13 aversion. Regret seems stronger when it is more certain to occur. Low variability makes 14 regret appear more certain to the participant In contrast high variability makes the loss of 15 not choosing the alternative route appear less obvious. It is likely that this is attributed to 16
hampering of learning as also demonstrated by Ben-Elia et al. (2008) . That is, as variability 17 in the choice environment increases, the rate of learning which route provides on average 18 a better payoff decreases. 19
In addition, the results seem to suggest that risk seeking might correspond to more 20 regret aversion compared to risk aversion. In the case of scenario 1, where Route A, which 21 is also on average faster, is associated with low variability and the slower Route B with 22 high variability -the estimate of regret aversion is not significant. This suggests that when 23 the alternative resulting in better payoffs, on average, is also regarded as safer, regret is 24 not observed. Nonetheless, it is also possible that the effect of risk aversion here is also 25 confounding regret aversion. In comparison, in Scenario 2 where the faster route (A) is 26 associated with greater risk, regret aversion is significantly higher. We recall that Ben-Elia 27 and Shiftan (2010) demonstrate that attitudes towards risk in scenario 2 reveal on average 28 more risk seeking tendencies. One possible explanation is that when facing a choice in a 29 domain of losses, (which also induces risk seeking behavior i.e., gambling), the emotional 30 amplitude of regret is greater when contending with a negative affective state i.e. an 31 outcome that leads to a possible loss. Conversely, when choosing the safer alternative 32 also results in good outcomes (as in scenario 1) negative affect is not induced and regret 33 is likely to be much weaker and even masked by risk aversion. In sum, these results assert 34 that payoff variability in the choice environment appears to be negatively associated with 1 the strength of regret aversion. Moreover, attitudes towards risk related to regret appear to 2 be quite relevant as demonstrated by Zeelenberg et al., (1996) and especially in the case 3 of risk seeking. 4
The results of the joint estimated models do not contradict the results above and 5 present the same trends for the estimated coefficients. In particular the assertions that 6 regret is associated more closely with feedback information and with the level of payoff 7 variability appears to hold for both groups. However, an additional result is demonstrated 8 by the estimate obtained for the non-informed group scale ().  is significant in both 9
Model E (p<0.001) and Model F (p<0.001). The estimates for  suggest that without 10 descriptional information (the non-informed group), regret is significantly weaker. This 11 means that regret aversion can be triggered even without any available description of the 12 travel time distributions (i.e. without the VMS) simply from a gradual trial and error 13 sampling of available alternatives and learning reinforced through experiential feedback 14 information. However, in the presence of descriptional information (the informed group) 15 regret emotions become much stronger. This leads us to the assertion that informed 16 travelers are more likely to experience higher levels of regret aversion than non-informed 17
ones. 18
In terms of theory, though not a concrete proof, the results seem to indicate the 19 relevance of the recent theoretical contributions such as feedback-conditional regret theory 20 (Humphrey, 2004) . However, it is not possible with the data we hold to completely 21 investigate FCRT given that the experiment did not allow for foregone payoffs. This is left 22 for future research endeavors. In addition the results obtained for models D and F 23 demonstrate that risk levels and corresponding attitudes are likely to be correlated with 24 regret. 25
Analysis of fatigue threats
26
As noted in Section 2.3, a common threat in repeated choice designs is the threat of 27 fatigue or boredom confounding the results and threatening their validity. To verify whether 28 fatigue might have interfered with our estimates we applied the methods suggested in the 29 literature. First, an analysis of the robustness of the design. Second, we measured the 30 signal to noise ratio obtained in the results by plotting the mean standard deviation (SD) of 31 the maximization rate (i.e. the share of the Fast route in each trial. Third, following the 32 debate in the choice modeling literature, we estimate the logit scale for different stages of 33 the experiment, per group in blocks of 10 trials.
Beginning with an evaluation of the design, Ben-Elia et al. (2008) who studied the 1 same dataset, did not find significant order effects in their analysis. This asserts that the 2 within-subjects repeated design was successful in counterbalancing the treatment orders, 3 therefore minimizing the risk of carryover effects threatening validity. This implies that the 4 participants did in fact relate to each scenario independently and hence the risk that 5 fatigue and learning were carried over from one scenario to the next is relatively small. 6
Next, regarding the signal to noise ratio, Figure 2 shows the mean standard-7 deviation of the maximization rate over 100 trials (averaged out for all three scenarios in 8 blocks of 10 trials). The results show that for both groups, informed and non-informed, the 9 signal to noise ratio is decreasing as the experiment progresses. This indicates that 10 learning is indeed taking place, at a faster rate with the informed group, whereas fatigue is 11 much less evident. In fact we can assert that after the first 10 trials on average, 12 participants" become quite experienced in making the correct route choice that minimizes choose efficiently as can also be seen in Figure 2 . 22
To summarize, the analysis of fatigue risks does not provide sufficient evidence to 23 suggest a significant threat to the validity of the results. Moreover, the analysis here shows 24 similar patterns to those already demonstrated by Ben-Elia and Shiftan (2010) and Ben-25 Elia et al. (2008) who discuss the key role of learning in informed and feedback-based 26 route-choice situations. The estimated scales raise another interesting issue related to 27 how regret is influenced by learning. One possible hypothesis is that learning mitigates the 28 amplitude of regret emotions as participants" subjective confidence in their choices gains 29 strength. Our results on regret aversion show that on average, regret does seem to be an 30 issue that arises under certain conditions. However, with the current data limited to 49 31 participants there is not enough variation to allow a proper analysis of this issue (i.e. toestimate regret aversion parameters for the different learning stages). We leave this for 1 future researchers to ponder on. 2
Conclusions 3
Regret Theory (RT) has been recently suggested as a viable behavioral theory, in 4 addition to traditional Expected Utility Theory and the well documented Prospect Theory, 5 to explain travel behavior phenomena including route-choice. These three theories have 6 also been adapted or at least tested in situations involving sequences of repeated choices 7 where the decision makers can learn by being provided with experiential feedbacks. 8
Repeated choices also characterize the day to day dynamics of travelling such as 9
commuting. 10
In this study we made use of an existing dataset collected by Ben-Elia et al. (2008) 11 in a relatively simple binomial repeated route-choice experiment where participants could 12 make their decision based both on descriptional information and experience. This dataset 13
was not designed a-priori to account for the occurrence of regret. Different model 14 specifications accounting for different sources of regret were applied and compared to a 15 simple choice model based on expected utility. In addition a joint estimation was 16 conducted for comparing the strength of regret with and without descriptional information. 17
The results assert that emotions of regret do appear to occur in the observed data 18 and that regret aversion is likely generated by the experiential travel time feedbacks 19 received by the participants ex-post their route choices rather than the descriptional 20 information provided to them ex-ante. This result also concurs with the assertions of the 21 more recent theories involving regret which account for feedbacks, such as conditional 22 feedback-based RT (Humphrey, 2004) . However, regret aversion is much more evident 23 when participants are provided with descriptional information whereas without such 24 information, regret aversion exists but is significantly weaker. Therefore it is the 25 combination of both descriptional and experiential information that results in higher levels 26 of regret aversion. These results suggest that with the proliferation of emerging 27 technologies for intelligent transport systems in road networks, it likely that travelers will 28 experience more regret in their route choices. Increasing emotions of regret aversion can 29 have significant impacts on network equilibrium as also demonstrated theoretically by 30 Chorus (2010) . This needs to be further investigated in a congested network like 31 experimental setting which accounts for equilibrium (e.g. Lu et al., 2011) . Furthermore, in 32 accounting for effects of risk, it seems that regret aversion is more apparent in situationsinvolving less risk, whereas riskier choices seem to inhibit regret, perhaps due to the 1 difficulty in perceiving the differences in outcomes (the payoff variability effect) and due to 2 other emotional effects linked to affective states related to risk attitudes. 3
Notwithstanding several limitations and future research directions to this study 4 should be noted. First, it is necessary to obtain further evidence for the importance of 5 reinforced learning in route choice behavior in experimental settings that also provide 6 feedback on foregone (i.e. non-chosen) alternatives. This would allow a better comparison 7 with the feedback-theoretical stream in Regret Theory such as FCRT. It would also provide 8 an indication to the behavioral effects of future intelligent information and communication 9
technologies that could well provide immediate foregone feedback. In addition, although 10 fatigue does not seem to play a major issue in repeated route choice, learning effects and 11 their influence in partially informed choice environments, such as transportation, are 12
clearly an important topic worth further research. Moreover, it is of added value to 13 understand how regret, risk perceptions and regret are influenced by long-term learning. It 14 is possible that with learning these effects might decline. Currently we can demonstrate 15 that regret (and to certain extent risk perception) is, on average, an emotion which is likely 16 to rise when both descriptional and experiential information are provided. However 17 whether and how regret changes over time is still an open question. A study involving a 18 larger panel of participants would make it possible to investigate the hypothesis that 19 learning could well mitigate the amplitude of regret aversion. 20
Second, in this study descriptional information was presented to participants as a 21 travel time range. Though useful to allow a visualization of travel time variability this is not 22 necessarily the only way to describe expected travel times. The framing effect illustrated 23 by Kahneman & Tversky (1979) , suggests that different forms of presenting information 24 will likely affect how choices are made. Recently, Waygood and Avineri, (2011) have also 25 observed framing effects in mode choice when provided with different information formats 26 regarding their environmental-friendliness (CO 2 emissions). Moreover, we used a relatively 27 strong assumption regarding how the information of travel time ranges would be 28 processed (the upper and lower quartiles) and how this in turn corresponds to regret 29 aversion estimates. However, there is nothing to preclude from other possible assumptions 30 such as the best and worst travel times on the range or even a greater degree of 31 heterogeneity in how travelers are likely to view travel time ranges. There is, therefore, a 32 place to study more flexible travel information representations that do not result in 33 cognitive overload and how these could assist perhaps in mitigating regret.Third, as shown by Gao et al., (2010) travelers could well anticipate the provision of 1 information on a route downstream resulting in more strategic behavior involving routing 2 policies. There is added value to investigate how emotions of regret could be related to 3 choosing among routing strategies and how this corresponds to the evolution of 4 equilibrium in simulated networks. 5 Nevertheless, our study provides additional empirical support to warrant further 6 investigations of regret in other travel behavior settings and especially in relation to the 7 possible behavioral impacts of intelligent transportation systems. 8 9
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